Israel and Iran

The UK has no leverage and less influence.

One aspect of Israeli politics that is often overlooked is that almost all politicians in Israel have served in the Israeli armed forces (IDF). The ultra-orthodox are exempt from conscription, as are Israeli Arabs, who make up about 20% of Israel’s population. Most of them have also served on operations, including Benjamin Netanyahu, who served in Israel’s special forces. His service included the hostage rescue on Sabena Flight 571 (alongside Ehud Barak, now one of his biggest critics).

All armed forces seek commanders with clarity of thought plus the willpower and charisma to follow their deductions through. For a state confronted with an existential threat one viable solution is to remove it, ideally without having to rely on other states’ support. Netanyahu has determined that Iranian possession of nuclear weapons is such a threat and that the development of those weapons is imminent. The IDF is acting to remove the threat, either by destroying it or degrading it so much that it is no longer imminent.

Some, like our lacklustre Foreign Secretary David Lammy, argue for “de-escalation.” How do you “de-escalate” an existential threat, other than by destroying it? Those who suggest that the strike was unlawful or unnecessary, such as Richard Dalton – once our ambassador to Iran, misses the point that a credible threat has two components, capability and intent. Dalton asserts that Iran has neither. That’s his opinion. He retired from the Diplomatic Service in 2006 after three years in Tehran. I doubt he is included in any UK or, more importantly, Israeli intelligence briefings despite his fellowship at Chatham House.

Threat = Means + Intent

As regards capability, the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) has, for the first time in 20 years, stated that Iran has been economical with the actualité in its reporting. (That’s the first time the IAEA has stated that publicly. It’s not impossible hat the Iranians have been faking their reports for longer). The IAEA assesses that Iran has some 182 kg of enriched uranium. 20kg is enough to make an atomic bomb. The current known (to the IAEA) Iranian stockpile is enriched to 60% so is not yet weapon ready. However there is no other purpose for uranium so expensive enriched in such quantities. (There are some medial uses for enriched uranium but that’s measured in grammes, not kilogrammes).

Iran already manufactures ballistic missiles and has an extensive armaments industry. Making a simple atomic warhead is (or was) easily within its technical ability. Indeed it could well already have the designs and even had the non-nuclear bits manufactured. Enriching Uranium to 60% comprises about 90% of the effort to get to weapons-grade uranium. It’s therefore undeniable that Iran has a nascent nuclear warhead.

Measuring intent is harder, even in a theocracy. However Iran has consistently armed those who kill Jews, specifically Hamas and Hezbollah plus the Houthis in Yemen. It has also directly attacked Israel since 2004. Iran does not recognise the State of Israel and supports proxies whose aim is the destruction of Israel. That may or may not constitute intent to use a nuclear weapon, but would you want to live in missile range of a nuclear equipped theocratic Mullah? Why would Israel take the risk?

Some question whether a pre-emptive strike is legal under international law. Certainly Article 51 does not specifically allow it. It merely states “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations” The International Rumpoles can discuss whether rockets from Iran’s proxies constitute an attack by Iran until the cows come home - paid by the hour, they probably will. They won’t answer the question of where was international law on 7^th October 2023?

No leader of any country can rely on the UK Charter to protect its people. The State of Israel was established by the UN precisely to provide a country in which Jews (and others) could be safe. Iranian actions since 1977 have directly and indirectly jeopardised that safety. Any Prime Minister’s first duty is to protect their country. That’s what the IDF exists for. That’s what they are doing. They have achieved what was thought to be impossible in Gaza and again in Lebanon and destroyed Hamas and Hezbollah as viable organisations.

Striking Iran

Militarily, launching precision air strikes some 2,000 kilometres away is no small task. Attack jets, like the Israeli Air Force’s F35s, F15s and F16s ,all trade bomb load versus fuel (i.e. range). This trade is particularly acute for the F35 as its stealth relies upon all weapons and fuel being carried internally. It seems the IAF modified its F35s to increase range without compromising stealth. Launching a lot of unstealthy air to air refuelling planes before launching an airstrike would rather give the game away. These modifications - vital to giving the IDF surprise - took time, probably years so the current IDF plan for removing Iranian nuclear power has existed for some time.

That’s not surprising; military commanders like having contingency plans. They also like testing that they work. We can be confident that the IDF have exercised this scenario multiple times in multiple ways. The nature of warfare is that things go wrong, from human errors to equipment failure, plans need to be robust. Most of all soldiers will tell you that “the enemy also has a vote.” A commander who wants his plan to survive contact with the enemy must ensure that the enemy’s scope for intervention is limited. Surprise is one method. For an air operation degrading air defence is another way to constrain the enemy’s response.

The Mossad drone strikes blinded Iran’s air defence network. (Historical note: it was the Israelis who pretty much invented the use of drones – including loitering munitions – to supress air defences back in the 1980s.) Make no mistake, Iran’s air defences are (or were) good. They include the Russian S-400 and other equally capable Iranian missile systems. But they can’t shoot down what they can’t see.

The IDF and cabinet have probably also examined likely Iranian retaliations to the strike. That assessment would include missile strikes. Despite fielding one of the world’s few anti-ballistic missile systems, Netanyahu and his advisors will have anticipated Israeli casualties long before they authorised the strike. It’s worth noting that Israel, the Jewish haven, goes to extraordinary lengths to protect its people and its service personnel.

The casualties that Iran’s missiles are inflicting now are extremely painful to the Israeli cabinet. They’re mostly ex-IDF. They hate casualties. They are not accepting them lightly. This pain is only acceptable to prevent greater Israeli suffering should Iran obtain a nuke. The attack was not launched on Netanyahu’s whim, as some who should know better suggest. It was launched because the Israeli government believes that the Iranian nuclear threat is imminent.

Iran’s Response

Iran’s immediate and predictable response has been to bombard Israel with ballistic missiles and drones. Some get through the Israeli air defences, some don’t. This will become a battle of stockpiles and who can make missiles or anti-missiles quicker. The Israeli Air Force is attacking known ballistic missile facilities with some success. Iran has (or had) some 1000 long range missile launchers. Many are mobile and Iran is a large country. Iran has experience of long range missile warfare. Seeking them out will be a long and difficult task, especially in those parts of Iran where the IDF have not destroyed the air defence. That doesn’t mean it can’t be done, just that it will take time, technology and perhaps) special forces on the ground.

The IDF appears to be seeking to minimise Iranian civilian casualties through public warnings, as they did in Gaza. Unfortunately the reality of destroying military capabilities nestling in urban areas is that civilians will be killed. Pick your outrage, Israel is reluctantly killing Iranian civilians while it attacks military facilities to remove an existential threat; Iran is simply killing Jews because that’s its foreign policy.

The Mullahs might judge that they can weather this storm, killing more Israelis than the Israel can tolerate while surviving the Iranian casualties. They could then start rebuilding their nuclear and missile capabilities. Iran might also seek to enlist international opinion to curtail and/or constrain Israel. It has some hope of that given the rapid evolution of pro-Palestinian protestors into Pro-Iranian ones in London. Of course, those protestors hold no power and the people they effect – some lefty western politicians – hold little power either. Westminster might heed them but a few RAF Typhoon jets don’t give the UK much of a voice in Israel, particularly given its censure of two Israeli politicians.

President Trump is front and centre. As yet the US have not joined the Israelis in combat operations which makes perfect sense. The Israeli strike plans are for national survival and therefore must be operable by Israel alone. The Americans are sending a second carrier battle group (a proper one, not the UK’s floating Potemkin Village currently in the “Indo-Pacific” ) to the Arabian Gulf. It’s more than likely that the US is also topping up the IDF ammunition stockpiles.

It seems unlikely that Iran’s supporters and sympathisers will persuade European and other leaders to act. Even if those leaders did seek to change President Trump’s position it’s unlikely that he would listen to them. Which means Iran might seek to widen the conflict in the hope of survival.

Block the Straits

Iran has threatened to block the Straits of Hormuz and the three ships on fire may be part of that attempt. It’s a serious threat as much of the world’s oil and LNG passes through the Straits. There may now be more oil producers than there were in the Tanker Wars of the 1980s (notably the United States courtesy of fracking) but most of the UK’s LNG (which fires the gas turbines that keep the lights on) comes through it.

Iran has used antiship missiles, suicide boats and mines to interrupt traffic on the Straits before and could do so again. While there are plenty of warships of multiple nationalities in the region, including some Royal Navy minehunters. Whether any are prepared to sink Iranian warships to keep the Straits open is unclear.

Meanwhile the IDF are striking Bandar Abbas, the major Iranian port city in the Straits and home of the Iranian Navy. The antiship missiles and fast attack craft based there would be vital to any Iranian blockade or naval action. The Israelis are already degrading them so Iran’s capability is shrinking.

Given the international interest in the Straits remaining open the UN might pass a resolution empowering the use of force to keep it open. Or, perhaps more likely, President Trump will decide that keeping the Straits open is vital to the US and issue his naval forces with robust rules of engagement to that effect. If either happen the remaining Iranian capacity to block the Straits will vanish.

Expanding the War

Iran could launch missiles at a range of US, UK and other nations’ facilities in the region. These would cause damage for sure. But to what end?

Were a US base hit it’s more likely that the US would strike back at Iran than it would seek to restrain Israel. As the UK has become a bystander in Israel’s future and lacks much in the way of military capability, a missile hit on a British base would not change Iran’s destiny (although it might settle a few grudges).

For all the Starmer’s posturing the Eurofighter can only shoot down cruise missiles and drones provided someone else, Israel or the US, provided airborne radar as the UK still doesn’t have any operational Wedgetail airframes. The only missile system the UK possesses capable of hitting a low end ballistic missile (on a good day) is the Sea Viper fitted to its Type 45 destroyers. Of the Royal Navy’s six destroyers three are in long term refit, one is with the carrier battleground and two are working up in the English Channel. The COBRA discussion of how the UK might support the US if they join the action against Israel must have been short.

Iran could strike other Middle Eastern nations. The justification would be complex and again it’s hard to see how Iran would benefit in its current war. Iran is Moslem but not Arab. Its Shia Mullahs are far from widely popular in the region. An unprovoked missile strike on an Arab state is unlikely to improve Iran’s image , garner support or deflect Israel from its mission.

Oil, Gas and Rare Earth

Israeli damage to Iran’s oil infrastructure and the threat of the closure of the Straits of Hormuz has caused a spike in spot oil prices; Brent Crude is up some 15% to 20% ($10 per barrel) since the Israeli strikes. That’s survivable – albeit bad news for the UK’s Chancellor. If, and it is if, Iran closed the straits of Hormuz prices would rise further. However the world has survived oil price shocks before and it would again.

Iran’s major oil customer is China, so China has leverage with Iran. It has also long been a supporter of the Palestinian cause. Unfortunately for Iran, China and the USA are locked talks to resolve their trade dispute. While they’re currently talking https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cql2x6d2zkgo China is unlikely to jeopardise them for the sake of the Mullah’s regime. Iran lacks leverage as China imports most of its oil from Russia.

If China imports more oil from Russia at a higher price, Ukraine’s already remote prospects of winning its war recede, as does Russian interest in a cease fire. That means that President Trump’s Ukraine rare earth deal is less valuable, so US talks with China (producer of lots of rare earth metals) rise in priority. As a trader and deal maker President Trump is comfortable in an environment where everything is connected to everything else (probably the only thing Lenin ever got right) Career diplomats, most newspaper commentators or lacklustre politicians aren’t. They need to sharpen up and catch up.

End Games

Prime Minister Netanyahu and many other Israelis see this conflict as the latest round of Israel fighting for its survival – depressingly familiar territory. They view the invasion of Gaza following the massacre of 7^th October 2023 in the same light. The same logic applied to the destruction of Hezbollah in Lebanon. It’s easy to sit in Paris, London or Toronto and forget that routine life in Israel before 7 October involved a large portion of the country and population living under the daily threat of rocket attack. Sometimes Iron Dome worked, sometimes it didn’t and Israelis died. That these attacks came from Hamas and Hezbollah acting as Iranian proxies is undisputed and indisputable.

It's also undeniably true that the residents of Gaza and the West Bank have a long list of justifiable grievances about Israeli conduct prior to 7 October, and indeed the whole creation of the State of Israel from what was the British Mandate. It’s also true that intifada and bombardment haven’t improved the Palestinian’s life one jot. The history is complicated and, as yet, no one has found a viable future for any of the belligerents. That’s unlikely to happen until both sides can cease fighting the old battles and look forward to a joint, peaceful future.

The much touted two state solution has geographic problems (the West Bank and Gaza aren’t contiguous and any connection between they would involve the loss of sovereign Israeli land.) The net result is that it’s acceptable to neither Israelis nor Palestinians. There are four alternative possible futures.

One is maintain the status quo (Latin for “the mess we’re in”) and carry on with the current borders and government structures. Once the nuclear defenestration of Iran has been completed there will be a race between Iranians rebuilding their nuclear and missile industries and the Israelis to track Iranian weaponry while rebuilding expanding their anti-missile stocks. Palestinian malcontents will seek more support, which they might or might not get from the rump of the anti-Zionist Arab states if Iran doesn’t survive.

The second is for the Iranian people to replace the Mullahs. That’s not easy and there is no guarantee that the next set of rulers would be any friendlier to Israel.

Thirdly, the Gaza and West Bank Palestinians could compare their quality of life with that of the 2 million Palestinian Arabs who are Israeli citizens and decide to join the State of Israel. IT was once unthinkable that Scotland would unite with England, but it did because needs must.

Fourthly Gaza and the West Bank could become UN protectorates. The history of them isn’t good, but there’s a first time for everything and the UN might delegate the running to a competent power.

None of the alternatives is easy. They all require the belligerents to be more focused on jointly a peaceful and prosperous future rather than arguing about the wrongs of the past. That almost happened in South Africa and it almost happened in Northern Ireland, both of which had a sudden but lasting outbreak of peace. It can be done.

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