Another Defence Review Won't Solve the UK Armed Forces' Problems
Kicking the can down the road isn't sound government, it's surrendering to the Whitehall machine.
Unsurprisingly defence didn’t play a big part in the election campaign. The previous Tory and Coalition governments had run the Armed Forces into the ground (and worse). The Labour Party comprises a broad coalition of candidates from CND badged unilateralist peaceniks to armed forces veterans. One quarter of what is now the cabinet didn’t agree with replacing Trident. When he was shadow Secretary of State for Defence John Healy (now the Secretary of State) said little of note, which worked well for him while Ben Wallace and his successors wallowed in the jargon fest of the Integrated Review which had to be “refreshed” (read re-written) when Russia invaded Ukraine and it turned out that tanks, armour and firepower were still fundamental components of warfare - contrary to the premises underlying the integrated review. Now Healy is in power he has committed to increasing defence spending when the economic circumstances allow (read never). In the meantime he’s launched yet another review.
The MOD loves defence reviews. They can start with a blank sheet of paper and play geopolitics as to what the threats to the UK and its interests may be. Their intelligence people can forecast future weaponry capabilities of potential enemies and their technology people can investigate how to defeat them and what technologies will be available. Defence suppliers, mostly BAe systems, will share their technology maps. Consulting allies might be helpful, so lots of trips abroad for the review’s authors will be necessary. Meanwhile the tactical doctrine fraternity will be invited to contribute their insights as to how wars could be fought and think-tank academics (most of whom have never been inside a battle tank) will produce papers. More prosaically the blood feuds between the various factions within the services will continue with increased vigour – there may be funds available or cuts to be averted.
Within the Royal Navy the Fleet Air Arm (FAA) will be fighting the surface combatants (one aircraft carrier costs about the same as ten frigates) while the submariners will remain silent and lethal. As the FAA and RAF operate the same aircraft, (the carrier capable F-35) the FAA /surface ships argument will escalate into an interservice battle royale. At one extreme the Royal Navy might propose taking over the RAF, at the other extreme the RAF will propose scrapping the carriers and buying more land based jets and air to air refuelling tankers. (This argument has worked before).
The RAF has its own problems. It hasn’t yet ordered all the F-35s that it wanted, using part of the Typhoon fleet for spares haven’t been universally welcomed, not least because four of the older ones must be retained to defend Falklands. . Surely it’s not impossible to place four Tranche 2 jets there?
Worse, the RAF still doesn’t have the vital E-7 Wedgetail airborne early warning platform in service and it’s not clear whether the Shapps review increased the number to be purchased (the current number of just three is generally thought to be insufficient). The A400 has at last been cleared for low level parachute delivery, closing one of the capability gaps created by the early retirement of the C130 Hercules. The RAF one of very few air forces not to use the proven, reliable and ubiquitous C130 which it scrapped at short notice to save money. Whether the current A400 fleet can fill all the roles filled by C130s and A400s is unclear.
The RAF is committed to funding the Tempest programme until 2025. (Tempest is the replacement for Typhoon). It’s being developed in conjunction with Italy and Japan by a consortium headed by British Aerospace (BAe). The first flight is due in 2025, by which time the MOD will have spent £2 billion on it. The announcement of a defence review, which might reasonably question the need for such a jet, has given BAe and the RAF a fit of the vapours. Without timely commitment to further funding the programme will slip and costs will rise. Whether anyone in Starmer’s government cares is unclear. The Tornado and Typhoon programmes suffered from similar political vacillation.
BAe is a master at playing this game – claiming jobs, exports and the defence of The Realm are all at risk if they aren’t given more taxpayers’ money. They might be right. In the meantime the RAF’s need for money for its latest shiny super-jet will impact on the Army. Again this is not new – one of the arguments for funding Typhoon was that it would destroy Russian tanks and was therefore a better investment than the British Army’s tanks. That was baloney, but it worked in the 1980s and it will probably work again.
Of course the Army does itself no favours. Delusional leadership has left it with a dysfunctional structure and an inability to deploy even one credible armoured brigade for protracted combat operations. When I left the Army in the early 1990s it was universally viewed as one of the best in the world. Now it’s tier two (at best) and in the eyes of it’s own senior officers is not fit for purpose and in need of significant increase in numbers. It needs more than that. Around half of its infantry battalions as dismounted – that is they move to combat on their feet without the benefit of armoured vehicles. That didn’t work in 1916, when we had an awful lot more artillery than we have now. It isn’t working in Ukraine either. Overlay the recruitment and retention problems and dismounted infantry battalion are a waste of money, consuming cash that would otherwise be available for pay and housing.
Mr Healey knew all this last year. He knew all this when the Labour policies were developed and when he said “Labour will ensure Britain is better defended. In Government, we will overhaul military recruitment, tackle the shameful state of military housing and establish an Armed Forces Commissioner as a strong independent voice to improve service life for our Forces and their Families." Delivering that doesn’t need a review, it needs decisive political leadership. Clearly that is not what Mr Healy sees as his job.
Tasking the organisation that has delivered defence failure for decades with producing yet another review is a pointless exercise in delay. What is needed resolute action now to transform the management of decline into an organisation capable of doing its job. Mr Healey should start by sacking all the senior management – as would have already happened in any corporation that had performed so miserably. Replace them internally or bring in outsiders. This may sound harsh – but it’s not as harsh as the treatment of Admiral Byng who was sentenced to death for failing to capture Minorca with an inadequate force. His execution in 1757 was undoubtedly unjust, but it focused the minds of military commanders. The MOD is failing far more profoundly on every level. It needs robust treatment.
He should change the career structure so that senior officers no longer play musical chairs every couple of years to develop in their careers. Currently if a defence procurement takes 15 years responsibility for that procurement will change at least five times. That’s no way to deliver success, as pretty much every MOD procurement in my lifetime has shown. Senior officers should stick with the programme until it is delivered. Buggins’ turn is not an extravagance that a cash strapped economy can afford; the brass hats should not expect it. Nor should the senior civil servants.
Fixing recruiting and retention through for junior ranks and sorting out service housing shouldn’t be as big a challenge as it seems. Pay rises for the lower ranks and better property management. How hard is it to run a housing estate for Heaven’s sake? Of course, an organisation that can’t manage residential property has no chance of buying high tech stuff effectively. Mr Healy should enquires at to whether the MOD selecting the correct people (military and civil service) for high office? On the available evidence they’re not, and haven’t been for almost a generation.
The establishment will call this simplistic. Possibly - this is a 1400 word article so space is limited - but the MOD has a history of overcomplication to mask institutional failure. It’s not the only government department that has this malaise, however it is the one that has most obviously reached a nadir and is therefore the one for whom drastic action is low risk – the MOD really couldn’t get much worse. Fixing the MOD would demonstrate how to fix the other failing behemoths of the government machine like the Home Office, the NHS, the BBC and the rest of them.
Of course it won’t happen. This government is the poodle of the state machine and the SW1 think tanks. But happen it must; if this government can’t make substantial progress quickly then it won’t get a second term and might not last five years. 66% of those who voted didn’t vote Labour, and on a turnout of 48% this means fewer than one in five of the population voted for this government. With that little public support it won’t have much of a honeymoon.
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